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Conflict Networks
Abstract
Conflict parties are frequently involved into more than one conflict at a given
time.Inthispapertheinterrelatedstructureofconflictiverelationsismodeled
asaconflictnetworkwhereopponentsareembeddedinalocalstructureofbi-
lateral conflicts.Conflict parties invest in specific conflict technology to attack
their respective rivals and defend their own resources.We show that there ex-
ists a unique equilibrium for this conflict game and examine the relation be-
tween aggregated equilibrium investment (interpreted as conflict intensity)
and underlying network characteristics.The derived results have implications
forpeacefulresolutionsofconflictsbecauseneglectingthefactthatopponents
are embedded into an interrelated conflict structure might have adverse con-
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Violent conﬂicts and wars are frequently observed phenomena in human history
and have always been in the research focus of social scientists. Recently, the
economists profession became interested in establishing general, and therefore
abstract models of conﬂicts based on a game-theoretical setup. Most of this
growing literature is based on stylized models of unique and isolated conﬂicts
between two or more conﬂict parties. The nature of the respective conﬂict is
then analyzed depending on speciﬁc idiosyncratic characteristics of the involved
conﬂict parties, e.g., Esteban and Ray (2008), Esteban and Ray (1999), Caselli
and Coleman (2006), Basu (2005), Skaperdas (1992), and Bevi´ a and Corch´ on
(2008). We depart from this literature by assuming that conﬂictive relations
between conﬂict parties are interrelated, i.e., a conﬂict party may be involved
into two or more diﬀerent conﬂicts involving diﬀerent opponents at the same
time. This interrelated structure results in local externalities when behavior by
agents is aﬀected by changes in behavior of direct (and also indirect) opponents.
Hence, our objective is to clarify the relation between the structure of those
interrelated conﬂicts and equilibrium behavior.
In this paper we restrict our analysis to bilateral conﬂicts which allows us
to represent the overall conﬂict structure as a network, or graph, where conﬂict
parties are linked if they are in a conﬂictive relation among each other. Hence,
we can interpret the structure of interrelated conﬂicts as a simultaneously played
conﬂict game, consisting of several distinctive bilateral conﬂicts, played on a
ﬁxed and given network.
Conﬂict parties can aﬀect the probability of winning against a particular
direct rival by investing into conﬂict speciﬁc technology, e.g., military equip-
ment, mercenaries, etc. The network structure of conﬂictive relations implies
that the investment decision of a conﬂict party may not only aﬀect the decision
of direct rivals but also of other parties that are not directly involved. This type
of interdependencies might induce spill-over eﬀects that are common in network
models of social interaction.
We model each bilateral conﬂict as a transfer contest, where contested re-
sources are transfered from the winner to the loser, see Appelbaum and Katz
(1986), Hillman and Riley (1989), and Leininger (2003).1 Hence, resources are
reallocated between direct rivals depending on their relative conﬂict investment.
This implies that conﬂict investment is socially ineﬃcient because conﬂict in-
vestment is social waste. In principle, a conﬂict party has also the option not
to invest anything into a bilateral conﬂict which would reduce social waste.
However, this option can be exploited by their rival and therefore will never
occur in equilibrium, i.e., investing into conﬂict speciﬁc technology resembles a
1The model is formulated in general terms such that diﬀerent interpretations for the under-
lying conﬂictive environment are possible: For instance, lobbying of several ﬁrms for several
distinctive issues at diﬀerent authorities could also be interpreted as a network of bilateral
conﬂicts where two ﬁrms are connected if they lobby for the same issue. Analyzing the de-
pendence of overall lobbying activity on the underlying relations of lobby issues and ﬁrms is
an important issue due to the social waste that is generated by these activities.
4prisoner’s-dilemma structure.
In this study we are especially interested in the relation between conﬂict
intensity (measured as the total equilibrium investment into conﬂict technol-
ogy by all opponents) and the underlying network structure. For reasons of
tractability we restrict our analysis in the ﬁrst part of the paper to the three
classes of conﬂict structures.2
• Regular conﬂict networks are characterized by a large degree of symmetry
among the opponents. In this context we brieﬂy discuss the anthropolog-
ical concept of conﬂictive peer polity interaction, that can be interpreted
as a description of regular conﬂict networks.
• Star-shaped conﬂict networks are characterized by a large degree of asym-
metry between a center and its periphery. Historically, the multitude of
conﬂictive relations among an empire and its surrounding neighbors, e.g.,
the Western Roman Empire, has this kind of core-periphery structure.
• Complete bipartite conﬂict networks consist of two coalitions that are
in conﬂict against each other. Ideological conﬂicts can be interpreted
as bipartite conﬂict networks because all members of one coalition share
the same ideology and consider each member of the hostile coalition as a
potential enemy, as it could be observed in the ideological conﬂicts of the
20th century, e.g., World War II.
For these classes of conﬂict networks we ﬁnd an intuitive relation between
the underlying network characteristics and conﬂict intensity: Within each con-
sidered class, conﬂict intensity is increasing in the number of conﬂictive relations
and the density of the network. Based on a prominent centrality measure, i.e.,
eigenvector centrality, we are also able to compare conﬂict intensity across the
three diﬀerent classes of conﬂict networks.
The relation between conﬂict intensity and network characteristics can also
be stated from the perspective of peaceful conﬂict resolution. Peaceful resolu-
tion of conﬂicts is here interpreted as an exogenous ad-hoc deletion of speciﬁc
conﬂictive links within the conﬂict network.3 For each of the three consid-
ered classes the established positive relation between conﬂict intensity and the
number of bilateral conﬂicts implies then that peaceful conﬂict resolution is
beneﬁcial because total conﬂict intensity is decreased if the number of links in
the respective class is reduced.
However, this result does not carry over to conﬂict networks that are not in
the considered classes. In fact, peaceful resolution of bilateral conﬂicts might
have adverse consequences: we provide a speciﬁc example outside the considered
2The examples of historical conﬂicts mentioned below are also frequently applied in the-
oretical concepts from social anthropology. We discuss those connections brieﬂy in the main
text.
3In most cases the conﬂict parties that are directly aﬀected by peaceful conﬂict resolution
will beneﬁt because no socially-wasteful conﬂict investments will be exerted for a resolved
conﬂict. Hence, for the aﬀected conﬂict parties peaceful conﬂict resolution can be interpreted
as exogenously enforced solution of the prisoner dilemma situation of conﬂict investment.
5classes where conﬂict intensity is increased as a consequence of peaceful conﬂict
resolution.
Obtaining general results for irregular networks is a complex issue due to
the fact that no closed form solution for an equilibrium exist. Nevertheless,
we are able to characterize indirectly equilibrium behavior in general irregular
networks. This equilibrium characterization can be used to derive the counterin-
tuitive result that an agent spending relatively more in total conﬂict investment
than its opponent will in expectation loose the bilateral conﬂict against the
respective rival.
Our approach is related to the recent network literature that considers games
that are played on a ﬁxed and given network structure, for instance, Bramoull´ e
and Kranton (2007), Goyal and Moraga-Gonz´ alez (2001), Calv´ o-Armengol and
Zenou (2004) and Ballester et al. (2006). As we are interested in local exter-
nalities, we depart from this literature in an important aspect: In our set-up
the individual action is link-speciﬁc (and therefore multi-dimensional) because
conﬂict investment is speciﬁc for each bilateral conﬂict.4 This is in contrast
with most of the network literature based on games played on ﬁxed and given
networks where an individual’s strategy space is usually assumed to be uni-
dimensional (and hence common for all neighbors).5 Our extension provides
a richer structure that also allows to analyze explicitly how a speciﬁc agent
reallocates her conﬂict investment among its diﬀerent bilateral conﬂicts.
Besides this diﬀerence there exists a close relation to Ballester et al. (2006)
where also the consequences of the network structure for aggregated equilibrium
actions are analyzed. In their model simple linear quadratic payoﬀ functions are
considered that facilitate the analysis substantially. However, we are interested
in the analysis of conﬂict situations and therefore consider payoﬀ functions that
are based upon so called contest success functions. This type of functional form
is frequently applied in the literature on conﬂict analysis and has a simple and
intuitive interpretation in this context. The caveat is that this functional form
is not linear quadratic which makes the analysis more complex.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we set
up a general model of conﬂict networks and show, in section 3, that a unique
equilibrium exists for our framework. We analyze three speciﬁc classes of conﬂict
network in section 4, and reinterpret and discuss our results from the perspective
of peaceful conﬂict resolution in section 5. In section 6 we analyze irregular
conﬂict networks. Finally, section 7 concludes.
4This might be due to the diﬀerent nature of the conﬂict, e.g., naval forces are more suited
than air forces in speciﬁc conﬂicts. Moreover, even if the same type of force is suitable in
various conﬂicts, the conﬂict party has to decide where they should be employed. Link-
speciﬁcity then simply implies that forces cannot be employed at two distinct locations at the
same time.
5For a recent exception with multi-dimensional individual strategy space, see Goyal et al.
(2008).
62 The Model
There is a set N = {1,...,n} of conﬂicting parties (from now on called agents)
that are embedded in a ﬁxed structure of bilateral conﬂicts, i.e., each agent i
is engaged into bilateral conﬂicts with some agents called her rivals. The set
of rivals of agent i is denoted by Ni ⊆ N \{ i} which implies that agent i is
involved in ni = |Ni| conﬂicts. The underlying structure of bilateral conﬂicts can
be interpreted as a ﬁxed network which is represented by a graph g consisting of
nodes (agents) and links (conﬂicts). Hence, if agent i is in conﬂict with opponent
j then gij = 1, while if there is no conﬂictive relation between them then gij =0 .
It is assumed that both opponents in a bilateral conﬂict are aﬀected in the same
way, i.e., the network is undirected and symmetric: gij = gji for all i  = j.T h e
set Ni of rivals of agent i can then be deﬁned as Ni = {j ∈ N \{ i} : gij =1 }.
The outcome of each bilateral conﬂict is probabilistic and depends on the
investment into conﬂict speciﬁc technology by the respective rivals. The invest-
ment of agent i into the conﬂict against rival j ∈ Ni is denoted by eij ∈  + and
the ni-dimensional vector of conﬂict spendings of agent i against all her rivals
(her strategy) by ei =( eij)j∈Ni. The vector of conﬂict spending that is directed
against agent i by all of her respective rivals is denoted by e−i =( eji)j∈Ni.
Our study is focused on the analysis of the eﬀects of the network structure on
equilibrium outcome. As the network structure by itself induces endogenously
heterogeneity on the agents (depending on their location), we exclude all other
sources of heterogeneity in our model to be able to concentrate exclusively on
this channel.6 Hence, it is assumed that all bilateral conﬂicts are symmetric in
the sense that rivals have identical perceptions with respect to potential gains
and losses in each bilateral conﬂict in which they are involved: If agent i wins the
conﬂict against any of her rivals j ∈ Ni she obtains an amount V of resources
of rival j, if agent i looses against j an amount V of her own resources are
transferred to the winning agent j,a n dv i c ev e r s a . 7 In other words, as a result
of the conﬂict contested resources are purely redistributed among direct rivals,
i.e., the loser has to fully compensate the winner. This assumption reﬂects the
frequently observed fact that underlying motivations for conﬂict are contested
natural resources, or territory, and that looting is and was a frequently observed
behavior of the winning conﬂict party. 8
The outcome of each bilateral conﬂict is governed by a probability function
that maps the conﬂict speciﬁc investments of the respective two opposing rivals
into a probability to win the respective conﬂict, i.e., agent i wins the bilateral
conﬂict against rival j with probability pij = p(eij,e ji) ∈ [0,1], which is twice
diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly concave in own spendings eij for each level
6In section 7 we brieﬂy discuss the consequences of an additional source of heterogeneity.
7This assumption implies that agents that have more rivals might potentially gain more
but also loose more resources than agents with a lower number of hostile neighbors, see also
the discussion in section 7.
8In Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), for instance, it is shown that economic factors (‘greed’), like
primary commodities and opportunity costs for conﬂict activity, have more predictive power
for the outbreak of civil war than political factors (‘grievance’), e.g. inequality or ethnic
polarization.
7of spending eij by its respective opponent j. It is also assumed that pij is
decreasing and strictly convex in the spending eji of its rival j.M o r e o v e r ,
it is symmetric in the sense that if two direct rivals i and j spend the same
amount, e = eij = eji, then they will win the conﬂict with the same probability:
pij = p(e,e)=pji.
Spending in conﬂict against rivals is related with a cost c(ei) that is a con-
tinuous, increasing and convex function with c(0,...,0) = 0.
The expected payoﬀ function of agent i is additively separable in costs and
expected wins and losses of all bilateral conﬂicts in which she is involved, and








For notational simplicity we reformulate this expression as follows:
πi(ei,e−i;g)=W(ei,e−i) − c(ei), (1)
where W(ei,e−i;g)=V

j∈Ni(pij − pji) denotes the expected ‘revenue’ of
conﬂict for agent i, i.e., the aggregated expected amount of transfered resources
that agent i wins or looses in all her bilateral conﬂicts. Note that, due to the
fact that each conﬂict is modeled as a transfer contest where losers have to
compensate the winner, the total expected revenue of the overall conﬂict game
(or, in other words, the aggregated value of contested and transfered resources)




This implies that equilibrium behavior does purely depend on the strategic re-
sponse to the network structure and is not confounded by the fact that diﬀerent
network structures induce diﬀerent values of aggregated resources.
Our objective is the analysis of overall conﬂict intensity, denoted by E∗(g),
and formally deﬁned as the aggregated level of conﬂict investment in equilibrium














j∈Ni eij is the aggregated conﬂict investment of agent i against
all her rivals j ∈ Ni. The variation of conﬂict intensity for diﬀerent networks
can then be determined by analyzing how E∗(g) depends on the variables that
characterize the respective network structure.
83 Equilibrium Analysis
For the conﬂict network game we will establish the existence of a unique equi-
librium by using results from Rosen (1965) and Goodman (1980).9 They estab-
lish existence and uniqueness for a concave n-person game based on the concept





where e =( e1,...,en), r =( r1,...,r n), and ri ≥ 0. Intuitively, this technical
condition guarantees that an agent has more control over her payoﬀ than the
other players.
The conﬂict network game satisﬁes the requirement of a concave n-person
game by assumption. Theorem 1 and 2 of Rosen (1965) imply that a unique
equilibrium exists in a concave n-person game with orthogonal constraint set11
if and only if the function σ(e,r) is diagonally strictly concave. Using a charac-
terization of Goodman (1980), the following conditions on the payoﬀ functions
are equivalent for diagonally strict concavity of function σ(e,r):
(i) πi(ei,e−i) is strictly concave in ei for all e−i,
(ii) πi(ei,e−i)i sc o n v e xi ne−i for all ei,
(iii) σ(e,r)i sc o n c a v ei ne for some r with ri > 0 for all i ∈ N.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium in the conﬂict network game.
Proof. The conﬂict network game is a concave n-person game by assump-
tion. To proof that it is also diagonally strictly concave it suﬃces to show that
conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisﬁed.
(i) W(ei,e−i) is strictly concave in ei for all e−i and for all i ∈ N be-






















∂eij∂eik = 0 elsewhere for all j,k ∈ Ni with
9The conﬂict game is neither an aggregative game (the reaction functions cannot be ex-
pressed in terms of aggregated strategies of all the other players), nor a supermodular game
(because the reaction functions are non-monotonic). This implies that common existence
proofs that are based on those characteristics, e.g. Galeotti et al. (2009), are not applicable
in this setup.
10For reasons of notational simplicity the dependence of the payoﬀ functions on graph g is
suppressed in the following paragraphs.
11A constraint set is orthogonal if it is uncoupled. This is the case in the conﬂict game
because the strategy space of each individual does not depend on the strategies of her rivals.
Note also that in Rosen (1965) the strategy space for each i ∈ N is convex and compact,
which is, in principle, not the case in the conﬂict game deﬁned above (here it is the non-
negative orthant). However, we can construct a (suﬃciently high) upper limit ¯ e such that all
strategies eij > ¯ e are strictly dominated (for instance by choosing eij = 0) due to the fact
that W(ei,e−i) ∈ [−niV,niV ] is bounded while c(ei) is unbounded. Hence, without loss of
generality we can restrict attention to the strategy space [0, ¯ e]ni of non-dominated strategies
for each individual i ∈ N which is convex and compact.
9j  = k.A s c(ei) is convex for all i ∈ N, the payoﬀ function πi(ei,e−i)i st h e
sum of a constant, a strictly concave and a concave function in ei. Hence, it is
strictly concave in ei for all e−i and for all i ∈ N.
(ii) Note that W(ei,e−i)=V

j∈Ni(pij − pji). Take a generic factor of










> 0 by assumption. Moreover, it is convex in e−i for all ei because















∂eji∂eki = 0, elsewhere for all j,k ∈ Ni with j  = k. This implies that
W(ei,e−i) is a sum of functions that are all convex in e−i for all ei. Hence,
W(ei,e−i)i sa l s oc o n v e xi ne−i for all ei. As the cost function does not depend
on conﬂict spending of the rivals, the function πi(ei,e−i)i sc o n v e xi ne−i for
all ei.
(iii) Assume that ri = r>0 for all i ∈ N. Then Eq. (3) simpliﬁes substan-






By assumption, the cost function is convex in own conﬂict spending. Hence, the
function σ(e,r) is a sum of concave functions which is also concave.
To derive closed form equilibrium expressions we adopt the following func-








This functional form captures the externalities of the network structure be-
cause the marginal cost of conﬂict technology for a speciﬁc bilateral conﬂict
also depends on the spending in all other bilateral conﬂicts in which agent i is
involved.13 Intuitively, this could be attributed to the fact that agent i has ac-
cess to a centralized (and convex) production process where conﬂict technology
for all her diﬀerent bilateral conﬂicts has to be produced. Agent i then allocates
conﬂict technology to the diﬀerent bilateral conﬂicts in which she is involved.
The outcome of a bilateral conﬂict is realized according to a contest success
function in the style of Tullock (1980), which is frequently applied in models
of conﬂict and contests.14 Under this contest success function the winning
12In section 7 the relevance of the speciﬁc functional form for the derived results is discussed.




ij), would not induce
externalities because neither marginal beneﬁts, nor marginal costs are aﬀected by the network
structure of conﬂicts. For this scenario the network structure would not have any impact. As
we are interested in the externalities that are induced by the underlying network, we stick to
the functional form presented above.
14Recent surveys that review the literature that is based on this functional form are Corchon
(2007) and Konrad (2007, 2009) for models of contests, as well as Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas
(2006) for conﬂict models.
10probability of agent i in the bilateral conﬂict against rival j is simply determined




eij+eji if eij + eji > 0,
1/2i f eij + eji =0 .
(5)
This functional form does not ﬁt exactly the setup as introduced before because
of its discontinuity at point (0,0), i.e., in the case that two rivals do not spend
anything in the respective bilateral conﬂict. However, properties (i), (ii) and
(iii) of the existence proof in Proposition 1 still hold for this speciﬁc functional
form. In the appendix it is shown how the existence result from Proposition 1
can still be applied to this framework.
Corollary10 in the appendix states that the unique equilibrium in the conﬂict
network game is interior. This implies that equilibrium investment turns out to
be socially ineﬃcient: Resources are merely reallocated while all agents invest
positive amounts into conﬂict technology and therefore face real costs. Hence,
aggregated expected equilibrium payoﬀ will be negative. This captures the idea
that conﬂicts are generally highly destructive and socially undesirable. In fact,
the socially eﬃcient outcome in this kind of conﬂict game would be not to invest
in conﬂict spending at all. In principle, all agents could voluntarily decide to
refrain from conﬂict investment. However, as in the prisoner’s dilemma, the
strategy of not investing into a speciﬁc bilateral conﬂict is exploitable by the
respective rival. To avoid exploitation all agents invest in equilibrium strictly
positive amounts in each of their bilateral conﬂicts.








i (g), for all k ∈ Ni and all i ∈ N.( 6 )
This is a non-linear system with

i∈N ni equations that does not allow a closed
form solution for general conﬂict structures. Therefore we will concentrate our
analysis at ﬁrst on three distinct classes of more structured conﬂict networks
that allow closed form solutions of the above system. An analysis for general
irregular networks follows in section 6.
4 Characteristic Classes of Conﬂict Networks
The three considered classes of conﬂict networks are distinct with respect to
their grade of symmetry. In our framework asymmetry is induced through the
underlying network structure in the sense that agents with a high number of
conﬂictive relations can potentially gain and also loose more resources than
agents with less conﬂicts. Hence, we consider on one side highly symmetric
conﬂict structures where each agent has the same number of conﬂicts, and, on
the other side, highly asymmetric conﬂict networks, e.g., conﬂicts among center
and periphery. An intermediate class are complete bipartite conﬂict networks
11consisting of two hostile coalitions where members of one coalition are in conﬂict
with each member of the opposed coalition.
The considered classes of conﬂict networks share some characteristics that
are emphasized in anthropological theories of (hostile) interaction among soci-
eties. Although the conﬂict game is highly stylized we try to relate and discuss
the derived results in light of this literature.
4.1 Regular Conﬂict Networks
Regular conﬂict networks are characterized by their high degree of symmetry
among rivals. The symmetry property among social entities in a local environ-
ment is also the crucial element in the concept of ‘peer polity interaction’. This
concept was introduced in Renfrew and Cherry (1986) to describe the historical
fact that complex societies often developed through interaction of autonomous
and homogeneous social units that were not related to each other in forms of
dominance and subordination. Peer polity interaction also included warfare and
conﬂict. Historical examples that could be subsumed under this concept are:
The Mycenaean states, the later small city-states of the Aegean
and the Cyclades, or the centers of the Maya Lowlands, that interact
on an approximately equal level. [...] The evolution of such clusters
of peer polities is conditioned not by some dominant neighbor, but
more usually by their own mutual interaction, which may include
both exchange and conﬂict. Tainter (1988, p. 201)
Our focus is on hostile interaction among peer polities and we associate the
symmetric nature of peer polity interaction with a regular conﬂict network.
Formally, a graph gR is called regular of degree d if each agent i ∈ N has
the same number d of opponents: ni = d for all i ∈ N. Hence, a regular graph
gR can be characterized by its degree d and the total number n of agents. The
corresponding class of regular networks is denoted by R and incorporates cases
such as the fully connected network, where d = n − 1, and a ring structure,
where d = 2, compare ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1: Regular Conﬂict Structures: Ring (left) and Complete Network (right)
12The following proposition describes the relation between those characteristics
and conﬂict intensity for the class R of regular networks.
Proposition 2 In conﬂict networks of class R,
(i) Conﬂict intensity is increasing in its degree d and in the total number n
of agents in the network.







(iii) Individual conﬂict investment and expected payoﬀ in equilibrium is de-
creasing in d and does not depend on n. Moreover, expected equilibrium payoﬀ
is negative for all agents.
Proof. By Corollary 10 there exists a unique and interior equilibrium of the
conﬂict game. The following (symmetric) conﬂict investment e∗ ≡ e∗
ij for all








, for all i ∈ N.











The last expression is increasing in the total number of agents and also in its
degree d. Simplifying the inequality E∗(gR1) >E ∗(gR2) yields the condition
presented in (ii).
As the equilibrium is symmetric, the probability to win (or loose) each bilat-
eral conﬂict is identical for all agents, i.e., p∗
ij = 1







, for all i ∈ N.
Clearly, e∗(gR)a n dπ(e∗
i ,e∗
−i;gR) are decreasing in d and independent of n
which establishes the statements of the proposition.
In equilibrium all agents choose the same level of conﬂict investment which
implies that they win each bilateral conﬂict with the same probability. By
deﬁnition the sum of expected transfered resources is equal to zero for each
agent. Hence, equilibrium payoﬀ is negative because an agent also faces the
cost of conﬂict spending. This situation is socially (and also Pareto) ineﬃcient
because universal peace would result in zero expected payoﬀ. The fact that
such a conﬂict structure induces socially ineﬃcient results is also acknowledged
in the historical analysis of the above mentioned examples:
13Successful competition by any Mycenaean polity would yield lit-
tle real return. The result was probably constant investment in
defense, military administration, and petty warfare, with any single
polity rarely experiencing a signiﬁcant return on that investment.
(ibid., p. 204).
Figure 2: A Star-Shaped (left) and a Bipartite Conﬂict Network (right)
4.2 Star-Shaped Conﬂict Networks
We now focus our attention on asymmetric conﬂict structures that are star-
shaped, i.e., where one agent is in conﬂict with all other remaining rivals while
none of the rivals is in conﬂict with each other, see the left part of ﬁgure 2. This
class of conﬂict networks has a center-periphery structure which is reminiscent
of historical empires that were frequently in permanent conﬂict with rivals at
their periphery, (e.g., the Western Roman Empire at the point of its largest
expansion).
Formally, a star-shaped conﬂict network consists of a center agent c who is in
conﬂict with all other agents such that gci =1f o ra l li ∈ Nc and Nc = N \{ c}.
All agents of set Nc at the periphery are only in conﬂict with the center but
not with each other, gij =0f o ra l li,j  = c and thus ni =1f o ra l li ∈ Nc.
This implies that there are in total n−1 bilateral conﬂicts in the star network.
Hence, the class of star networks, from now on denoted by S, is completely
characterized by nc = n − 1, the number of agents in the periphery.






2V − (Ec)2 − (n − 1)V, (7)






2 − V. (8)
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium in this class of star-
shaped conﬂict networks.
14Proposition 3 In conﬂict networks of class S
(i) Conﬂict intensity is increasing in the number nc of agents in the periph-
ery.
(ii) For the center agent individual (aggregated) conﬂict investment is de-
creasing (increasing) in nc, while equilibrium probability and expected payoﬀ is
decreasing in nc. For the periphery agent the same relation holds with respect
to individual conﬂict investment, while the relation is inversed for equilibrium
probability and payoﬀ.
Proof. By Corollary 10 the equilibrium is interior and unique. Inspection of
the ﬁrst order conditions reveals that the center agent invests the same amount
in each of her conﬂicts, i.e., e∗
c(gS) ≡ e∗
ci(gS) for all i ∈ Nc. This also holds
for each agent p in the periphery: e∗
p(gS) ≡ e∗




















c(gS) are the equilibrium probabilities











Individual conﬂict investment as expressed in Eq. (9) is decreasing in nc for
the center agent c and the periphery agent p. Aggregated conﬂict investment










V,which is increasing in
nc. Plugging the obtained expressions into the payoﬀ functions in Eq. (7) and






















∂nc < 0a n dt h a t
∂πp(ep,ec;g
S)
∂nc > 0. Hence, equilibrium payoﬀ
for the center agent is decreasing in nc, while it is increasing for an agent at the
periphery.














which is increasing in nc.
The results stated in proposition 4 imply that the center agent is worse
oﬀ if she faces more bilateral conﬂicts with the periphery. This is intuitive
because additional opponents of the center agent will also invest in the bilateral
conﬂict which forces the center agent to invest more into total conﬂict spendings
15(E∗
c(gS) is increasing in the number of agents in the periphery). However, this
is not suﬃcient to induce equal or higher probability to win in each of her
conﬂicts. The marginal cost of the center is relatively higher compared with a
star-shaped network with less agents which explains why p∗
ci(gS) is decreasing in
nc. In addition, for n>2w eh a v et h a tp∗
ci(gS) < 1
2. Hence, in conﬂict networks
with more rivals the center will more frequently loose conﬂicts in expectation.
As a consequence, expected equilibrium payoﬀ π∗
c(gS) is strictly decreasing
in the number of rivals. This result bears some similarities to the historically ob-
served tendency of expanding empires to collapse at some point in time because
expansion requires more total investment for an increasing number of conﬂicts.
However, this types of investment are related with diminishing marginal returns,
as is argued in Tainter (1981). The following quotation clariﬁes his argumenta-
tion:
The economics of territorial expansion dictate, as a simple mat-
ter of mathematical probability, that an expanding power will ulti-
mately encounter a frontier beyond which conquest and garrisoning
are unproﬁtable. [...] The combined factors of increased costliness
of conquest, and increased diﬃculty of administration with distance
from the capital, eﬀectively require that at some point a policy of
expansion must end. (ibid, p. 148 f.)
Although based on a speciﬁc historical case, i.e., the decline of the western
roman empire, this quotation reﬂects the importance of marginal increasing
costs (or equivalently declining marginal returns on investment) which is also
the driving force in the results for star-shaped conﬂict networks.
4.3 Complete Bipartite Conﬂict Networks
An intermediate case with respect to the symmetry of the underlying conﬂict
structure are complete bipartite conﬂict networks where the members of two
hostile coalitions are in conﬂict among each other. Hence, each agent of a
coalition is in conﬂictive relations with all the members of the hostile coalition,
as represented in the right part of ﬁgure 2. This type of conﬂict structure
resembles an ideological bipolar conﬂict because members of the two hostile
coalitions perceive each other as enemies.15
Moreover, the common ideology among coalition members implies that there
are no conﬂictive relations among agents of the same ideology. Historical exam-
ples of conﬂicts that ﬁt to this description are the massive ideological conﬂicts
in the 20th century, especially the second world war where each country of the
Axis Powers were (at least at some point in time) in conﬂict with nearly each
member of the Allies.
15As mentioned earlier our basic assumption is that the underlying conﬂict network is
exogenously given. For a recent contribution that shows how a bipolar coalition structure
can be the stable equilibrium outcome in a coalition formation game embedded in a conﬂict
framework, see Jackson and Morelli (2007).
16A complete bipartite network, denoted by B, consists of two sets (coalitions)
of agents, X and Y ,t h a te a c hh a v ex = |X| and y = |Y | members. All members
of set X are in conﬂict with each member of set Y and vice versa, such that
gij =1f o ra l li ∈ X and all j ∈ Y . Agents of the same coalition are not in
conﬂict among each other: gij =0f o ra l li,j ∈ X or i,j ∈ Y which also implies
that X = Nj for all j ∈ Y and vice versa.
The payoﬀ function of an agent i ∈ X in a complete bipartite network B can






2V − (Ei)2 − yV, (11)
and vice versa for an agent that is member of coalition Y . Note also, that the
star-shaped network is a special case of a bipartite network where one coali-
tion only consists of one (center) agent, i.e., S ⊆ B. Therefore, the following
proposition is a generalized version of Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 In conﬂict networks of class B,
(i) Conﬂict intensity is increasing in the number x and y of each coalition.
(ii) Conﬂict intensity in a complete bipartite network gB1 is higher than in
gB2 if and only if:
x1 y1 >x 2 y2.
(iii) A larger coalition is beneﬁcial for its members, i.e., each member of the
more numerous coalition invests less in total conﬂict investment, wins each bi-
lateral conﬂict with higher probability and has higher equilibrium payoﬀ.
Proof. By Corollary 10 the equilibrium is interior and unique. Inspection of
the ﬁrst order conditions reveals that each member of the same coalition invests
the same amount in each of her conﬂicts, e.g., for i ∈ X: e∗
x(gB)=e∗
ij(gB)f o r
all j ∈ Ni and all i ∈ X. A symmetric observation holds for all agents j ∈ Y .
Hence, there exist only two levels of individual equilibrium conﬂict investment















y for members of coalition X and p∗
y(gB)=1− p∗
x(gB)










∂y < 0, and that
p∗
x(gB) >p ∗
y(gB) if and only if x>y . Total conﬂict investment of an agent














17This expressions is strictly increasing in x as long as x<yand becomes strictly
decreasing for x>y . Using the derived solutions to calculate expected equi-















which is strictly increasing in x. Note that this relation also implies that, for




−j;gB) if and only if
x>y .








This expression is obviously increasing in x,a sw e l la si ny, the number of agents
in each coalition, which proves (i). Solving the inequality E∗(gB1) >E ∗(gB2)
yields the condition stated in (ii).
In a complete bipartite conﬂict network a coalition becomes more powerful if
it has more members. The intuition for this result is similar to the star-shaped
network: Assume for a moment that x>y , then Proposition 5 implies that
members of coalition X will in expectation win each bilateral conﬂict with higher




ij(gB), and therefore p∗
ij(gB) > 1
2. Moreover, aggregated conﬂict investment
E∗
j(gB) of an agent j of coalition Y is increasing in x but this increase is not
suﬃcient to keep the win probabilities constant among all bilateral conﬂicts in
which she is involved. This relation also holds with respect to equilibrium payoﬀ
that is increasing in the number of members of the respective own coalition. If
the lead in coalition membership is suﬃciently large (out of the perspective of
coalition X:i fx>y (3+
√
5)/2 ≈ 2.62y) then it is possible that the conﬂict game
results in positive equilibrium payoﬀ for the members of the more numerous
coalition.16
4.4 Conﬂict Intensity and Centrality
In the previous sections equilibrium outcomes were analyzed separately for each
of the considered conﬂict classes. In this section we presenta result that allows to
compare conﬂict networks that belong to diﬀerent classes within the considered
ones. This cross-comparison is facilitated by establishing a relation between
conﬂict intensity and network centrality, here eigenvector centrality, across the
considered classes of conﬂict networks R, S,a n dB. Its union is denoted by
C ≡ R ∪ S ∪ B.17
16As a star-shaped network is a special case of a complete bipartite network, this result also
holds for star-shaped conﬂict network, i.e., if the number of players in the periphery is 3 or
larger, then agents at the periphery have positive equilibrium payoﬀ.
17A star-shaped network is a special case of a complete bipartite network, i.e. S ⊆ B.W e
included it in the deﬁnition for completeness.
18The following additional notation is used: The symmetric adjacency ma-
trix18 G represents graph g and has elements gij where gii =0f o ra l li ∈ N
(because no agent is in a conﬂictive relation with herself). The largest eigen-
value of G, denoted by μ(G), is real-valued and positive because G is symmetric.
By the Perron-Frobenius theorem the components (μ1(G),...,μ n(G)) of the
eigenvector that corresponds to the largest eigenvalue μ(G) are all positive and
frequently interpreted as a centrality measure of the respective nodes of graph g.
Solving the characteristic equation for the considered classes of conﬂict networks
implies that:
• for regular networks: μ(gR)=d and μi(gR) = 1 for all i ∈ N.
• for star-shaped networks: μ(gS)=
√
n − 1, and




n − 1. (14)
• for complete bipartite networks:19 μ(gB)=
√
xy, and, assuming without
loss of generality that x>y :





for all j ∈ Y.
Based on this notation the following relation holds:
Corollary 5 For the class C of conﬂict networks total conﬂict intensity is pos-
itively related to the number of conﬂicts in the respective network and negatively
to the largest eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix. Individual conﬂict spending is






















Proof. Applying the derived eigenvector results for the diﬀerent network classes
to the equilibrium solutions for each type of conﬂict network yields the statement
in the corollary.
The comparison of equilibrium outcomes between the considered classes R,
S,o rB based on this corollary is straight forward. The following example, that
18To save on notation we identify a network class with its adjacency matrix.
19It was already mentioned that a star-shaped network is a special case of a complete
bipartite network. This fact is also reﬂected by the expressions for eigenvalues and -vectors,
i.e., the eigenvalues and -vector of a star-shaped network can be obtained from those of a
bipartite network by simply setting x = c and y = n − 1.
19compares ring- and star-shaped conﬂict networks, provides the insight that the
local externality that is generated by the center agent plays an important role
for conﬂict intensity.
Two types of network structures are considered: g1 is a ring-shaped network,
i.e., a regular network of class R with degree d =2 ,g2 is a star-shaped network













The last condition implies, in combination with Eq. (15), that the diﬀerence
in conﬂict intensity between g1 and g2 is solely determined by the relation of
their largest eigenvalues: E∗(g1) >E ∗(g2)i ﬀμ(G1) <μ (G2). It also should
be mentioned that a ring-shaped network with n agents is compared with a
star-shaped network that involves n + 1 agents, i.e., there is always one agent
more involved in g2 than in g1.
The largest eigenvalue of the ring-shaped network g1 is equal to its de-
gree, μ(G1) = 2, and therefore independent of the number of involved agents.
However, the largest eigenvalue of the star-shaped network g2 is equal to the
centrality of its center, μ(G2)=μc(G2)=
√
n, which is increasing in the num-
ber of involved agents. Hence, the comparison of conﬂict intensity between g1
and g2 does crucially depend on the centrality of the center in g2.
The direct comparison between g1 and g2 reveals that for n>4t h er e l a -
tion E∗(g1) <E ∗(g2) holds. In other words, although the number of conﬂicts
is identical among g1 and g2 the star-shaped network induces higher conﬂict
intensity for a low number of bilateral conﬂicts which is related to the fact that
an additional agent is involved in the star-shaped network g2. For higher num-
ber of conﬂicts the centrality of the center agent in the star-shaped network is
increased. Being more central implies higher externalities which tend to reduce
conﬂict investments by aﬀected agents. The r ee x i s t sac u t - o ﬀv a l u ef o rt h en u m -
ber of bilateral conﬂicts (n = 4) from which on the relation of conﬂict intensity
between g1 and g2 is reversed: for n>4 we can observe that E∗(g1) >E ∗(g2).
Hence, for a suﬃciently high number of bilateral conﬂicts the local externality
that is induced through the center agent on each agent on the periphery becomes
so dominant that conﬂict intensity is lower in the star-shaped network.
5 Peaceful Conﬂict Resolution
In our framework agents are linked if there is a conﬂictive relation among them
and then they decide how much to invest in each of their bilateral conﬂicts.
Lemma 2 revealed that in equilibrium all agents invest positive amounts into
each of their bilateral conﬂicts. This also implies that conﬂict parties cannot
by themselves induce a peaceful outcome with zero conﬂict investment for the
respective bilateral conﬂict.20
20This result holds although in most cases both direct rivals would proﬁt from zero invest-
ment. As already mentioned, the prisoner-dilemma like structure implies that they cannot
20Hence, peaceful conﬂict resolution is interpreted as the ad-hoc deletion of
conﬂictive relations in a given conﬂict network. Formally, the graph g that
remains after peaceful conﬂict resolution is a subset of the original graph g .T h e
crucial question is how conﬂict intensity is aﬀected by changing exogenously the
network structure, or, in other words, if peaceful conﬂict resolution is beneﬁcial
in the sense that conﬂict intensity is reduced.
The following proposition answers this question under the restriction that
the original and the resulting conﬂict network belongs to class C of regular,
star-shaped, or bipartite conﬂict networks.
Proposition 6 For class C peaceful conﬂict resolution is beneﬁcial with respect
to conﬂict intensity:
If g ⊂ g ,w h e r eg ∈ C and g  ∈ C, then E∗(g) <E ∗(g ). (18)
Proof. From proposition 2, 3, and 4 peaceful conﬂict resolution implies re-
duced conﬂict intensity if the resulting conﬂict network after peaceful conﬂict
resolution remains within the same class. It remains to check whether this re-
sult also hold across the considered classes. For peaceful conﬂict resolution of
star-shaped conﬂict networks the proof is trivial because the resulting conﬂict
network is always star-shaped. Also, peaceful conﬂict resolution of bipartite
networks is clearly beneﬁcial if the resulting network is star-shaped because
star-shaped are subclasses of bipartite networks (Proposition 4 can be applied
directly). The remaining two cases are therefore:
1. Case: g ⊂ g ,w i t hg ∈ R and g  ∈ B
Peaceful conﬂict resolution is beneﬁcial if E∗(g) <E ∗(g ). We calculate
the largest possible conﬂict intensity ¯ E∗(g)=m a x g⊂g  E∗(g) for a regular
network g (with maximal degree ¯ d and maximal number ¯ n of agents)
that results from a bipartite network with x (y) members of coalition
X (Y ) through deleting links. Assume without loss of generality that
x<y .T h e n¯ d =m i n {x,y} = x, and similarly for ¯ n =m i n {x,y} = x.
Hence, maximal conﬂict intensity for a regular network that results from
a bipartite network is ¯ E∗(g)=
√
x3V . This is clearly less than E∗(g )= 
(xy)
3
2V , which proves the statement.
2. Case: g ⊂ g ,w i t hg ∈ B and g  ∈ R
We derive the largest possible conﬂict intensity ¯ E∗(g)=m a x g⊂g  E∗(g)
of the resulting bipartite network with x (y) members of coalition X (Y )
that stems from a regular network g of degree d with n agents. We then
show that ¯ E∗(g) <E ∗(g ) which proves the statement.
The bipartite network must satisfy the following inequalities: x + y ≤ n,
mutually commit to the eﬃcient strategy of zero investment because it will be exploited by
the rival.
21x ≤ d,a n dy ≤ d, where one of this equation must be strict.21 Conﬂict




2V will be maximal if
x = y because (xy)
3
2 is a concave and symmetric function. Hence, there
are two cases to check for the inequality ¯ E∗(g) <E ∗(g ) to be satisﬁed:
• x = y<dand x + y = n which implies that x = y = n
2 and n<2d:




4 , which is satisﬁed because n<2d.
• x = y = d and x + y<nwhich implies that n>2d: Based on
this information the inequality ¯ E∗(g) <E ∗(g ) can be reduced to:
d3 < n
2d
4 , which is satisﬁed because n>2d.
As the inequality ¯ E∗(g) <E ∗(g ) is satisﬁed for both cases, this relation
also holds for E∗(g) <E ∗(g ), which proves the statement.
Proposition 6 is restrictive in the sense that it only covers cases where the
process of peaceful conﬂict resolution starts and ends with a conﬂict network
in class C. For irregular conﬂict networks that are not member of class C the
proposition makes no statement.
Figure 3: Example S2 before (left) and after (right) peaceful conﬂict resolution
In fact, peaceful conﬂict resolution can have highly adverse consequences.
In the following example, for instance, peaceful resolution of bilateral conﬂicts
does lead to an increase in total conﬂict intensity. Here, two centers of two
identical star networks (that each have nc = n − 1 agents in their respective
periphery such that there are in total 2n agents in this conﬂict network) are in
21Without the last restriction the following case could occur: x = y = d where n = d/2.
Here, the regular network with n =2 d describes a complete bipartite network with x = y = d.
As we consider a resulting regular network after the deletion of links, this case can be excluded.
22conﬂictive relation with each other. We are interested in the consequences for
overall conﬂict intensity induced through resolving the central conﬂict between
the center agents. The resulting graph of two stars with linked centers is denoted
by S2 and is represented, together with the situation after conﬂict resolution,
i.e., two isolated stars, in ﬁgure 3.















where ecc denotes the conﬂict spending of one center against the other.22
Based on numerical solution techniques it is possible to calculate the con-
ﬂict intensity E∗(gS2) for this network constellation and to compare it with
2E∗(gS), i.e., conﬂict intensity in a network with two isolated star-shaped con-








Table 1: Conﬂict intensity for gS2 and gS
Surprisingly, resolving the central conﬂict may actually imply an increase
in conﬂict intensity. More precisely, if nc > 10 then E∗(gS2) < 2E∗(gS), i.e.,
peaceful conﬂict resolution induces higher conﬂict intensity if each of the two
stars has more than ten agents in the periphery. If nc < 10 then conﬂict intensity
decreases.
This result can be related to the negative externality that the center agent
exerts on the respective rivals in the periphery. This externality is induced
through the decrease in the number of conﬂictive relations of the center agent:
The direct eﬀect is that the two center agents spend less in aggregated conﬂict
investment because they face less direct conﬂicts. However, they also shift part
of the conﬂict investment from the resolved central conﬂict to the periphery.
Agents in the periphery react to this increase in conﬂict spending of their rival
(the respective center agent) by also increasing investment into this conﬂict.
22Note that both star networks have the same number of agents in their periphery. It can
be shown that the only interior equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that both center agent
invest the same amount into the conﬂict against each other. Hence, it is not necessary to
discriminate between the two center agents.
23To apply those techniques it is assumed that V = 1. Results are similar for diﬀerent
numerical values of V.
23Hence, if the number of periphery agents is suﬃciently large, those indirect
eﬀects (the externality induced by resolving the central conﬂict) by the periphery
dominate the direct eﬀect of decreased aggregated spending by the two center
agents.
This example shows, that paying attention to the underlying structure of
conﬂicts is crucial for the success of peaceful conﬂict resolution. It also sug-
gests that the resolution of bilateral conﬂicts should be targeted with respect to
the underlying conﬂict structure to guarantee a reduction of conﬂict intensity.
However, ﬁnding the bilateral conﬂict that would (by peacefully resolving it)
induce the maximal decrease in conﬂict intensity requires an analytical solution
of Eq. (19) which in general does not exist for conﬂict networks outside of class
C. In the next section we derive partial results that indirectly characterize the
bilateral conﬂict that induces the highest aggregated conﬂict spending. This
bilateral conﬂict might constitute a presumably valuable target for peaceful
conﬂict resolution.
6 General Irregular Conﬂict Structures
The results derived in the previous section are based on the assumption that
the conﬂict network belongs to class C. This assumption is now relaxed by
extending the analysis to general irregular networks. As already mentioned,
individual conﬂict spending can be characterized as the solution to the following
system of
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i , for all k ∈ Ni and all i ∈ N. (19)
Analytical solutions for this system of non-linear equations do in general not
exist. However, the following reformulation allows to derive some additional
indirect results.






















The probability to win the bilateral conﬂict can be expressed in terms of aggre-










24The dependence of equilibrium conﬂict spendings on graph g is suppressed in the following
section for notational convenience.
24It is assumed that the agents are ordered according to their level of aggre-
gated equilibrium investment, i.e., E∗
1 ≤ E∗
2 ≤ ...≤ E∗
n.25 Then the following
relation holds in equilibrium:
Proposition 7 If agent i is in conﬂict with agent j and i<jthen agent i will
win this conﬂict with higher probability.
Proof. If i<jthen E∗
i ≤ E∗
j because the agents are ordered. By Eq. (20) this
implies that e∗
ij ≥ e∗








This result is counter-intuitive at ﬁrst sight because it states that agent i will
win the conﬂict against j although she invests in total less in all her conﬂicts
than her rival j. However, the reason for j investing relatively more in total
conﬂict spending in equilibrium is due to the fact that she either faces very
aggressive rivals or because she has a lot of them. Both situations favor her
direct rival i who can guarantee a high winning probability because agent j
will not invest too much into the conﬂict against i in comparison to her other
conﬂicts. Note, that the same intuition has been discussed in the section on star-
shaped networks where the center agents is the one with highest total conﬂict
investments but still looses in expectation in each bilateral conﬂict with the
periphery.
By combining Eq. (20) and (21) it becomes obvious that individual conﬂict
spending into a singular bilateral conﬂict is totally determined by the aggregated








This allows the simpliﬁcation of the system of

i∈N ni ﬁrst order conditions as









j)2V for all i ∈ N.
However, this system of equations is still non-linear and can not be solved ana-


















Note that the same caveat as in footnote 25 applies here because E∗,a sw e l l
as E∗
i , depend on the whole network structure g. This implies that changes in
the network structure g, for instance ad-hoc deletion of conﬂictive links, aﬀect
25Ordering agents according to their aggregated individual equilibrium spending obviously
depends on the network structure. In this sense Proposition 7 is an indirect result because
this order is based on equilibrium outcomes.
25E∗ in two ways: First, there is a direct eﬀect because at least one gij takes on
a value of zero which tends to reduce conﬂict intensity (at least one term in the
sum of Eq. (23) is eliminated. Second, there are also indirect eﬀects because all
agents in the network will react to the change in aggregated conﬂict investment
that is induced by the direct eﬀect. This implies that all remaining terms in
the sum are altered. In general, it is not clear which eﬀect dominates the other
because the indirects eﬀect depend in a complex way on the network structure
g.26
Nevertheless, those results can be used to determine the bilateral conﬂict
that induces the highest aggregate conﬂict investment maxj∈Ni E∗




ji. By Eq. (21) E∗
ij is maximal for the bilateral conﬂict be-
tween those agents that have the lowest aggregated conﬂict investment. This
seems to suggest that isolated bilateral conﬂicts where aﬀected agents do not
have any additional rivals induce the highest levels of conﬂict spending. Intu-
itively, for agents in isolated conﬂicts there is no local externality from other
conﬂicts that tends to reduce conﬂict investment. The question whether such
an isolated conﬂict is the optimal target for peaceful conﬂict resolution must
remain open because the feedback eﬀects that are induced by resolving alterna-
tive (and more embedded) bilateral conﬂicts cannot be compared based on the
indirect results derived here.
7 Discussion
The model as presented in section 4 ﬀ. is based on speciﬁc functional forms.
Here, we argue that our results are (at least qualitatively) robust to more general
speciﬁcations as long as they are in the framework of section 2. For instance, we
additionally considered a convex (but not necessarily quadratic) cost function
of the type c(ei)=Er
i with r>1 that did neither alter our results for conﬂict
networks of the combined class C, nor the indirect results derived in section 6.27








s ∈ (0,1] should not alter our results substantially.
In our set up heterogeneity among agents is implicitly induced by the rel-
evant position in the potentially irregular network structure. Hence, adding
another source of heterogeneity, for instance diﬀerent valuations or diﬀerent
cost functions, might inﬂuence our results. If this second source of heterogene-
ity is suﬃciently important then it will dominate diﬀerences in behavior induced
26In the example presented in section 5 the indirect eﬀects dominated the direct eﬀects,
while this is never the case for peaceful conﬂict resolution of conﬂict networks within class C.
27The numerical values that we derived in section 4.3 and section 5 would obviously be
diﬀerent without aﬀecting the argumentation in these sections. Also the relation to eigenvector
centrality is sensitive with respect to quadratic cost functions, compare Ballester et al. (2006)
for a brief discussion of this issue. It should also be mentioned that for r → 1 the externality
that is induced through the network structure vanishes because for r = 1 the marginal costs
of investing into a speciﬁc bilateral conﬂict is independent of the other conﬂict investments of
an agent.
26by diﬀerent locations in the network. The following extension clariﬁes this intu-
ition for conﬂict networks of class C. We relax the assumption that each agent
can win (or loose) in principle the samea m o u n to fr e s o u r ces in each conﬂict.
Instead, the value of contested resources depends now on the number of rivals
that an agent faces: Vi = V
ni. Equilibrium investment is now identical for each
agent in a given network of class C: e∗
ij(gc)=k(gc) for all j ∈ Ni and all i ∈ N,
where k(gc) is a constant that depends on the underlying network structure.28
Hence, in this speciﬁcation the heterogeneity of the network structure is exactly
balanced out by the heterogeneity in valuations.
In our framework we assume that the underlying conﬂict network is given ex-
ante without specifying how it came into existence. Hence, the formation process
of the conﬂict network could be an interesting extension. However, the usual
stability conditions, for instance pairwise stability, see Jackson and Wollinsky
(1996), are not applicable in our context because at least one rival in each
bilateral conﬂict has negative payoﬀ in equilibrium. This would imply that at
least one agent would sever the respective link in each bilateral conﬂict such that
all conﬂict networks would be unstable. Still, our model has some elements of
network formation because investing zero into a speciﬁc bilateral conﬂict is part
of the individual strategy space of an agent. Two direct rivals could therefore
leave a link inactive if they mutually decided not to invest into the respective
conﬂict. We already argued that this mutually beneﬁcial strategy cannot occur
in equilibrium because it is exploitable by the involved agents. Hence, the
reason why agents in our set up do not decide to endogenously dissolve links
is not related with network stability but with the lack of commitment devices
that would allow them to coordinate on peaceful behavior.
8 Concluding Remarks
Analyzing conﬂict situations that are embedded in a structure of conﬂictive
relations yields constructive results with respect to equilibrium conﬂict inten-
sity and network characteristics. While we conﬁrm the intuitive statement that
more conﬂictive relations imply higher conﬂict intensity for an important class
of conﬂict structures, i.e., regular, star-shaped, and complete bipartite con-
ﬂict networks, we also provide an example under which this statement is not
true. Nevertheless, a general relation between conﬂict intensity and a promi-
nent centrality measure is established for the three mentioned classes of conﬂict
networks.
Extending the analysis to more general irregular networks is a complex is-
sue due to the fact that no closed form equilibrium solutions exist. Indirect
results allow us to characterize the bilateral conﬂict that induces maximal con-
ﬂict investment. Moreover an inverse relation between individual aggregated
conﬂict spending and the individual win probability for each bilateral conﬂict
is established.
28For regular networks individual conﬂict investment is now also independent of the respec-
tive degree, i.e., all regular conﬂict networks induce the same individual conﬂict investment.
27An advantage of our simple model is that, contrary to most of the literature
that considers games played on ﬁxed networks, the resulting equilibrium is in-
terior and unique. This feature in combination with the very intuitive contest
rule should make our model especially attractive for experimental approaches
which is part of our ongoing research.
Appendix
Due to the discontinuity of the applied contest success function (CSF) with
pij =
eij
eij+eji at the point (0,0) the existence result est a b l i s h e di nP r o p o s i t i o n
1 cannot be applied directly.29 Therefore, an extended existence result for the
conﬂict network game as speciﬁed in Eq. (1), (4) and (5) is provided in this
appendix based on the following line of arguments. In Lemma 8 we show that an
equilibrium (if it exists) in the conﬂict network game as speciﬁed in Eq. (1), (4)
and (5) must be interior. We then use a suggestion by Myerson and W¨ arneryd
(2006), where it is observed that the CSF pij =
eij
eij+eji can be obtained as the
limit of the function ¯ pij =
eij+a
eij+eji+2a as a → 0f o ra>0. This alternative CSF30
is continuous everywhere and also satisﬁes all the conditions of Proposition 1.
Therefore, Lemma 9 states that there exists a unique equilibrium in a conﬂict
network game based on this alternative CSF ¯ pij which is also interior. As pij
can be obtained as the limit of ¯ pij where the same relation also holds for its ﬁrst
order conditions, Corollary 10 then states that there must exist a unique and
interior equilibrium for the original conﬂict network game based on Eq. (1), (4)
and (5).
Lemma 8 If an equilibrium exists in the conﬂict network game as speciﬁed in
Eq. (1), (4) and (5) then it is interior.
Proof. The proof consists of two parts:
1. Claim: Two direct rivals cannot exert zero conﬂict investment in equi-
librium in their respective bilateral conﬂict.
Consider an arbitrary strategy proﬁle (ei,e−i), where eij = eji =0a n d
j ∈ Ni. Consider now the following strategy e 
i =( ei1,...,e  
ij,...,e ini)
where e 
ij =   for   suﬃciently small. This is a proﬁtable deviation because
πi(e 
i,e−i;g) >π i(ei,e−i;g)a sp(e 
ij,e ji)=1>p (eij,e ji)=1 /2 due
to the discontinuity at (0,0) while lim →0c(e 
i)=c(ei) because the cost
function is continuous.
2. Claim: An agent cannot exert zero conﬂict investment in equilibrium
against a rival with positive conﬂict investment.
29There also exist alternative approaches that provide existence proofs for discontinuous
payoﬀ functions which might be applicable in our framework, for instance, Baye et al. (1993),
and Reny (1999). However, in this literature the issue of uniqueness is usually not addressed
which is crucial for comparative static analysis.
30A similar functional form is also used, for instance, in Nti (1997).
28Assume by contradiction that there exists an equilibrium strategy pro-




n)w i t hj ∈ Ni where agent i invests
e∗
ij =0a n di t sr i v a lj invests e∗
ji > 0 into the respective bilateral conﬂict.
The following strategy is a proﬁtable deviation: e 
j =( e 
ji,e∗
j−i)w h e r e
e 
ji ∈ (0,e ∗
ji)a n de∗
j−i = {e∗
jk}k∈Nj/i, i.e., agent j only reduces conﬂict
spending against rival i without altering conﬂict investment in all other











−j;g). Hence, e∗ cannot be an equi-
librium strategy proﬁle.
Interiority of equilibrium would imply that an equilibrium can be character-
ized by ﬁrst order conditions. Note also, that the strategy that is related with
this discontinuity cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy.
Based on the mentioned suggestion by Myerson and W¨ arneryd (2006), we




eij + eji +2 a
with α>0. (24)
Note ﬁrst that the CSF pij can be obtained as the limit from the alternative CSF
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Note also that Eq. 24 is continuous everywhere and that a conﬂict network
game based on Eq. (1), (4) and (24) satisﬁes all the conditions mentioned in
Proposition 1. Hence, by the same proposition a unique equilibrium exists for
this setup. The following Lemma summarizes this result and additionally shows
that this equilibrium is interior.
Lemma 9 There exists a unique and interior equilibrium for the alternative
conﬂict network game based on Eq. (24).
Proof. The alternative CSF ¯ pij is everywhere continuous and a conﬂict network
game based on this alternative CSF is a concave game which is diagonally strictly
concave. Hence, Proposition 1 can be applied to proof that there exists a unique
equilibrium. This equilibrium is also interior for a suﬃciently small, which is
proved in a similar way as in Lemma 8:
• Claim 1: For a suﬃciently low two direct rivals cannot exert zero conﬂict
investment in equilibrium in their respective bilateral conﬂict .
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ij = e∗
ji =0 .E v a l u a -











ij, which should be non-positive to sus-
tain an equilibrium e∗. However, the last expression will be positive for
small a which is a contradiction to the statement that e∗ is an equilibrium.
29• Claim 2: For a suﬃciently low an agent cannot exert zero conﬂict invest-
ment in equilibrium against a rival with positive conﬂict investment.





n)w i t hj ∈ Ni where agent i invests e∗
ij > 0
and its rival j invests e∗
ji = 0 into the respective bilateral conﬂict. This
implies that in equilibrium the respective ﬁrst order condition for player i











ij = 0. However,
in the limit for a → 0 the last equality cannot hold which contradicts the
statement that e∗ is an equilibrium.
The results obtained so far imply that, by Lemma 8, an equilibrium in the
original conﬂict network game based on CSF pij is interior (if it exists) and
therefore characterized by ﬁrst order conditions. By Lemma 9 the alternative
conﬂict network game based on the continuous CSF ¯ pij has a unique and interior
equilibrium which is therefore also characterized by ﬁrst order conditions. We
also showed that pij as well as a generic equation from its system of ﬁrst order
conditions can be obtained in the limit for a → 0 from the alternative CSF
¯ pij. Hence, for the limit a → 0 the equilibrium result carries through which is
summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 10 There exists a unique and interior equilibrium for the conﬂict
network game as speciﬁed in Eq. (1), (4) and (5).
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